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There is a strong philosophical (e.g., Plato, Aristotle, 
Pascal, Hume, Kant, and Frege) and psychological (e.g., 
Freud, 1900/1953, and James, 1890/1950) tradition be-
hind the assertion that there are two modes of thinking 
(i.e., logical and intuitive). These forms of thinking are 
described as being in conflict with each other, with logical 
thought confounded by primitive intuitions. The dualist 
framework still pervades current thinking, and in recent 
developments in the psychology of reasoning, a similar 
framework has been used (e.g., Evans & Over, 1996; Slo-
man, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). The current view 
is that one mode of reasoning generates inferences auto-
matically, without any step-by-step, logically defensible 
basis. The other mode of reasoning is deliberate and slow, 
because it allows individuals to hypothesize—that is, to 
think about possibilities that do not necessarily have a ref-
erent in the world. Because of these characterizations, the 
different modes of reasoning cannot be reconciled within 
a single reasoning mechanism.
The dichotomy has been investigated in the adult-
 reasoning domain, and although the evidence that is com-
patible with this distinction has been growing, Osman 
(2004) has provided arguments that call into question the 
empirical and theoretical status of dual-system theories of 
reasoning. In addition, although this framework has also 
been used to accommodate evidence from developmental 
studies of reasoning, research in adult reasoning and re-
search in child reasoning have remained relatively sepa-
rate, and there has been no examination of the different 
dual-system frameworks in both domains. Therefore, our 
main objectives in this article are to contrast the different 
claims made by dual-system theories of adult and child 
reasoning and then to evaluate their claims against evi-
dence from developmental research on reasoning.
The article will begin with an introduction to the main 
dual-system theories of adult reasoning (Evans & Over, 
1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000) and the 
principal dual-system theory of developmental reason-
ing and memory (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001). We then will 
draw on research in which children’s reasoning has been 
examined in the domains of mathematics and science and 
will evaluate the claims made by the theories described. 
Here, we will discuss the tenets of the research program—
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in particular, the significance it places on the role of sa-
lient task properties in understanding the development 
of rules that children apply automatically to a range of 
problems. We then will return to the main claims made by 
dual-system theories of reasoning and will evaluate them 
according to the findings we have described. In the final 
section, we will argue that although the evidence is consis-
tent with some hypotheses of the dual-system framework, 
the conditions under which intuitive rules are applied and 
the reasoning phenomena that ensue are best character-
ized by a framework that has as its central tenet the dy-
namic relationship between consciousness and reasoning, 
and that proposes that implicit, explicit, and automatic 
forms of reasoning are different manifestations of a single 
reasoning system.
Dual-SyStem theorieS of reaSoning
The dual-system theories of reasoning discussed pres-
ently differ according to the labels they use to refer to 
the different reasoning systems. We will avoid using the 
terms intuitive and analytic, because different dual-sys-
tem theories attach different meanings to each of these 
terms. In addition, the research program discussed in the 
next section refers to intuitive in a different way from the 
dual-system theories. To avoid confusion, we will use the 
term primary to refer to the system that the theorists de-
scribe as associative (Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 
2000), heuristic (Evans & Over, 1996), System 1 (Evans 
& Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000), 
and intuitive (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001) and the term sec-
ondary to refer to the system that theorists label analytic 
(Brainerd & Reyna, 2001; Evans & Over, 1996), System 2 
(Evans & Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 
2000), logico-deductive (Brainerd & Reyna, 2001), and 
rule based (Sloman, 1996; Stanovich & West, 2000).
All the theories are introduced according to three cen-
tral aspects: (1) how the two reasoning systems encode 
information, (2) their functional role, and (3) how they 
interact with each other. At the end of this section, we 
will summarize the main claims that the theories make 
(Table 1) but will save contrasting their different positions 
on various aspects of reasoning until the empirical section 
of this review.
encoding
Evans and Over (1996) have claimed that the primary 
system operates over representations that are the most rel-
evant to a particular problem space; that is, they follow 
their first (cognitive) principle of relevance: “Human cog-
nitive processes are aimed at processing the most relevant 
information in the most relevant way” (Evans & Over, 
1996, p. 48). This includes representations that are con-
textual (e.g., rooted in everyday experiences of the world) 
and pragmatic (i.e., carry linguistic information about, 
e.g., shared beliefs, prior knowledge, presuppositions of 
motives). The primary system is said to operate over preat-
tentive representations that include both selective features 
of the problem content and relevant associated knowledge 
retrieved from long-term memory. The secondary system 
is described as operating over the representations in the 
primary system, as well as representations of possibilities 
that can be abstract and purely hypothetical.
In Sloman’s (1996, 2002) account, the primary system 
is based on representations held in long-term memory, but 
it is also able to operate over representations generated 
online during the solution of a task; that is, because the 
systems can generalize automatically on the basis of simi-
larity, a computation of similarity between novel stimuli 
can occur while the reasoner is solving a task. In essence, 
the representations carry structural information and con-
textualized information. The secondary system operates 
over representations that have extracted the key features of 
the problem; but in this case, unlike representations in the 
primary system, the structural information is constrained, 
and ingrained in these representations are abstract con-
cepts, such as necessity and sufficiency.
Stanovich and West (2000) have characterized the pri-
mary system as operating over representations that are 
highly contextualized, personalized, and socialized; these 
are global properties of stimuli. Stanovich (2004) also has 
claimed that normatively appropriate knowledge can be 
automatized and, so, become imbued in the primary sys-
tem, as the result of practice that is often initiated due 
to the metacognitive abilities instantiated in the second-
ary system. Like Evans and Over (1996), Stanovich and 
West (2000) proposed that the secondary system operates 
over representations in the primary system, but also over 
representations that are abstract (i.e., decontextulaized, 
depersonalized, and desocialized), in order to support hy-
pothetical thinking.
Brainerd (Brainerd & Reyna 1992, 2001; Reyna & 
Brainerd, 1995) has proposed that the primary system 
operates over gist memory traces. These are memory 
traces that preserve the underlying meaning of a task and 
contain relational or pattern-like information that is also 
tagged with episodic information. The secondary system 
is characterized as logico-deductive, and it often involves 
implementing a formal principle over precise and accu-
rate representations. This system operates using verbatim 
memory traces; these generally preserve the precise sur-
face details of the task.
functioning
Evans and Over (1996, 2004) have described the pri-
mary system as retrieving and applying experiential-
based representations to a problem automatically. There 
is no conscious reflection involved in the application of 
the representations to the problem, because relevance 
enables the automatic retrieval of prior knowledge about 
a problem—particularly, if it is contextualized. The sec-
ondary system generates inferences and decisions in a 
slow sequential manner because it supports hypothetical 
thinking. It is involved in the evaluation of a model (a 
concept, theory, rule, or inference) used to implement the 
satisficing principle. This principle states that instead of 
optimizing a decision/choice among possible alternatives, 
the current model is maintained if it sufficiently satisfies 
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the constraints set by the individual but that it can be over-
turned if there is contrary evidence that shows the model 
to be unsatisfactory. The secondary system is, therefore, 
a resource-bound system that is highly demanding of ex-
ecutive functions and is also effortful, because it serves to 
inhibit responses automatically generated by the primary 
system. In addition, because the primary system reveals 
only the end products (i.e., the response) of processing 
to consciousness, the secondary system serves to invent 
rationalizations (i.e., justifications for the response) of the 
inferential steps that might have contributed to the gener-
ating of the end products.
Sloman (1996) describes the primary system as typi-
cally reproductive; that is, the system relies on representa-
tions that are based on past experiences. However, as has 
already been mentioned, the system is also able to reason 
from newly experienced stimuli through a similarity-
based method of generalization. Therefore, there is some 
flexibility in this system, because pattern matching can 
occur without employing any deliberate intentional goal-
directed manner. This can lead to the generation of in-
ferences on the basis of representations newly acquired 
during the solution of a task. The secondary system is pro-
ductive and systematic and, so, can generate an unlimited 
number of new representations because it is rule based; 
that is, it is an operator that connects two representations 
that can be generalized to other representations that are 
different, as well as similar. Unlike the primary system, it 
involves deliberate analysis and, so, is strategic and goal 
directed. In this way, it abstracts the most relevant proper-
ties of a problem. In addition, although the primary system 
generates responses to problems quickly, the representa-
tions that are often processed in a characteristically serial 
manner require monitoring and are, therefore, metarepre-
sented, which is why the secondary system is slower.
Stanovich (2004) has described the primary system as a 
collection of processes referred to as the autonomous set 
of systems (TASS). They are executed without any con-
scious reflection and operate in parallel with each other 
and the secondary system. Once they are triggered, they 
run to completion, which makes it difficult to override the 
inferences that are automatically generated. Also, because 
TASS involves representations that are well practiced, it 
does not make any demands on executive functions while 
the system is running. The secondary system is slow, cum-
bersome, and computationally expensive, because the rea-
soner must keep conscious track of the representations 
that are operated over. The secondary system enables hy-
pothetical thinking. Decoupling (i.e., making contextual-
ized representations abstract) is thus critical, because it 
requires thinking about possibilities that are dissociated 
from belief-laden representations that have a referent in 
the world.
Brainerd and Reyna (2001) have claimed that the func-
tioning of the systems is integral to the kinds of representa-
tions they operate over. The primary system involves gist 
representations and, so, operates over the essential (rela-
tional, semantic, and structural) properties of a problem, 
which are later used to generate inferences automatically. 
Brainerd and Reyna (2001) also proposed that because of 
this, there is a bias toward relying on the primary system 
for most reasoning, judgment, decision-making, and prob-
lem-solving tasks. The primary system generates responses 
quickly and efficiently because of the kinds of representa-
tions it operates over, which is why reasoning performance 
cannot be reliably indexed by working memory capacity or 
indexes of cognitive ability. The primary system is flexible 
in order to accommodate the developmental changes in the 
extraction and abstraction of different gist representations. 
The secondary system functions when the task demands 
the application of rules to precise details—for example, 
mathematical calculations. In such cases, the solution is 
valid only if the correct operation and the precise values of 
the problem are accurately combined.
interactive relationship
Evans and Over (1996) claimed that there are condi-
tions in which the secondary system inhibits responses 
generated by the primary system. Often, the systems 
compete, because the initial belief-based response, gener-
ated by the primary system, is flagged as inappropriate 
to the task by the secondary system. The outcome of the 
conflict depends on the individual. Some reasoners’ final 
responses will be belief based, whereas individuals with 
higher cognitive abilities or experience with the particular 
task domain will succeed in overriding their belief-based 
responses and will give a logic-based answer. However, 
given the relevance principle that Evans and Over (1996) 
proposed, the relationship between the primary and the 
secondary systems is highly interactive, particularly be-
cause, as a default, the primary system will determine the 
relevant representations that the secondary system oper-
ates over.
Sloman (1996) claimed that, because of the efficiency 
and speed of execution of the primary system, it normally 
precedes the secondary system in generating responses to 
a problem. However, the secondary system is able to sup-
press the primary system in situations in which the prob-
lem format is familiar to the individual. Often, the systems 
operate in a complementary manner, which is why it is dif-
ficult to identify conditions in which one operates exclu-
sively. However, although both systems can generate the 
same response to a problem, there are situations in which 
the task cues both systems and the responses are contrary 
to each other. Sloman (1996) refers to these conditions as 
Criterion S, which are tasks that invite conflicts between 
the systems. Typically, the primary system is invoked first, 
and either spontaneously or through instruction, the sec-
ondary system generates a contradictory response, and 
because the properties of the task invoke both systems 
strongly, they compete.
Similarly, Stanovich and West (2000) claimed that as 
well as supporting hypothetical thinking, the secondary 
system functions to override the representations that are 
automatically generated by the primary, default system. 
The secondary system’s ability to decouple (depersonal-
ize, decontextualize, and desocialize) the representations 
supplied by the primary system develops with other cog-
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nitive ability (working memory, digit span, and IQ). This 
is why individuals with higher cognitive ability are able 
to override responses generated by the primary system, 
because the inhibitory mechanism is effective and alterna-
tive correct representations are readily available.
Brainerd (Brainerd & Reyna 1992; Reyna & Brainerd, 
1995) claimed that accurate reasoning develops under 
conditions that demonstrate the interaction between the 
primary and the secondary systems. This involves encod-
ing the appropriate gist information from the problem, 
inhibiting inferences that are likely generated from verba-
tim representations, avoiding irrelevant gists, and, finally, 
retrieving and implementing the correct formalism (rule, 
principle, or mathematical operation). Brainerd (2004) 
also outlined the relationship between the primary and 
the secondary systems under U-shaped and inverted U-
shaped patterns of development. Brainerd proposed that in 
U-shaped curves, increases in a particular treatment vari-
able (e.g., forgetting or varying the exposure duration of 
stimuli in subliminal semantic activation tasks) will lead to 
increases in the influence of the primary system (i.e., gist 
memory), which decreases performance on a behavioral 
measure (e.g., recalling a word list). Increases in the treat-
ment variable produce larger increases in the influence of 
the secondary system (i.e., verbatim memory) than in that 
of the primary system. Increases in the treatment create 
an equilibrium, represented as the plateau on the devel-
opmental curve. Eventually, increases in the treatment, 
in turn, increase the influence of the secondary system, 
which then dominates the primary system. The same prin-
ciple works in reverse for inverted U-shaped curves.
Preliminary Summary
Table 1 summarizes the main characteristics of the pri-
mary and secondary systems that dual-system theories of 
reasoning propose. The table also includes a summary of 
the claims made by the research program; these will be 
discussed in the next section. The greatest disparity be-
tween the theories is based on the types of representations 
that are thought to be encoded in the primary system. In 
contrast, the dual-system theories of adult reasoning agree 
on many of the properties of the secondary system. How-
ever, Brainerd and Reyna’s dual-system theory differs in a 
number of fundamental ways from the other dual-system 
theories’ characterizations of both systems.
In the next section, we will introduce the developmen-
tal research program from which we evaluate the various 
claims made by dual theorists. We will set out the paradigm 
used to examine the development of intuitive rules and 
will define the kinds of phenomena that are investigated. 
A detailed discussion of the main claims made by the dual-
 system theories of reasoning and the contrasts between 
adult and developmental theories will then follow.
DeveloPmental reSearCh 
Program: intuitive ruleS
One of the many research routes that has been pursued, 
in an effort to understand the development of the reason-
ing process, is the investigation of intuitive inferences 
(e.g., Dixon & Dohn, 2003; Dixon & Moore, 1996, 1997; 
Siegler, 1999, 2004; Stavy & Tirosh, 2000). Stavy & Tiro-
sh’s (2000) research program examines intuitive reasoning 
extensively in the educational domain. In particular, Stavy 
and Tirosh (2000) detail the development and application 
of intuitive rules in a variety of scientific and mathemati-
cal disciplines. They show that specific features of a given 
task encourage children to rely on a domain-general rule 
that is automatically invoked to generate a response. The 
rules are pervasive, and although they can generate re-
sponses efficiently, they are employed in tasks that are 
conceptually unrelated and may, therefore, lead to errone-
ous responses. Moreover, they do not diminish with cog-
nitive development but, instead, persist into adulthood. In 
the following discussion, we will describe in more detail 
what intuitive rules are and the conditions in which they 
are applied.
intuitive rules
The rules referred to by Stavy and Tirosh (2000) are 
intuitive because children often experience them as self-
evident and self-consistent cognitions (Fischbein, 1987). 
That is, children’s responses generated from these rules 
appear to be prima facie, much like a reflex to a given set 
of task stimuli. The rules themselves (e.g., more A–more 
B, same A–same B, everything comes to an end, or every-
thing can be divided) are operations that translate some 
property of the task and generalize it to make an inference 
about another property. There is no preplanning involved 
in retrieving them. They are simply implemented as a re-
sult of the task’s properties.
For example, an intuitive rule such as more of A (e.g., 
weight, height, volume, width, density, size, area, time, 
or distance) implies more of B generates quick judgments 
in situations in which an individual is comparing quanti-
ties by drawing on task properties (e.g., area) that help 
discriminate between two items (e.g., a square and a tri-
angle). It is then used by extension to form a judgment 
about another property (e.g., a perimeter) (n. H. Ander-
son, 1987; Piaget, Inhelder, & Szeminska, 1960; Stavy 
& Tirosh, 1996, 2000). The application of the rule is ob-
served in a host of tasks that are based on conservation 
(e.g., one in which the taller of two containers is consid-
ered to have more water, despite the fact that they contain 
equal amounts) and comparison (e.g., one in which an 
angle with longer arms is judged as greater than an equiv-
alent angle with shorter arms). These types of erroneous 
inferences are made by children and adults (Zaskis, 1999; 
Zaskis & Campbell, 1996a, 1996b). The intuitive every-
thing comes to an end and everything can be divided rules 
are expressed in many repeated division problems (e.g., 
repeated halving, decreasing series such as serial dilution, 
radioactive decomposition, etc.) in which children are 
asked whether the repeated division will terminate. Many 
young children tend to respond that such processes are fi-
nite, thereby demonstrating use of the everything comes to 
an end rule (Stavy & Tirosh, 2000; Tirosh & Stavy, 1996; 
yair and yair, 2004). Many older subjects claim that such 
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processes are infinite, thereby demonstrating use of the 
everything can be divided rule, regardless of whether the 
object is mathematical (where the process is actually infi-
nite), physical, or biological (where the process is finite).
Saliency. To understand the role of saliency in child 
reasoning—and in particular, how it relates to the appli-
cation of intuitive rules—we first will describe what we 
take saliency to mean and then will discuss its relevance 
to how intuitive rules are invoked. Since no precise defini-
tion of saliency has been provided in reasoning research, 
we will draw on evidence from perception research to 
provide an operational definition of saliency. A salient 
stimulus is arousing. Attention and behavioral resources 
are preferentially directed toward a given stimulus for 
two reasons. First, the features of a task capture attention 
without the intention of the observer (e.g., Lamy, Leber, 
& Egeth, 2004; Zink, Pagnoni, Martin-Skurski, Chap-
pelow, & Berns, 2004), which is referred to as bottom-up 
or stimulus-driven saliency. Second, behavioral resources 
are also directed toward stimuli that have intrinsic proper-
ties that are relevant to the individual. This occurs through 
top-down factors—that is, according to the individual’s 
prior knowledge and experience and his or her goals or in-
tentions (e.g., Lamy et al., 2004; Lleras & von Mühlenen, 
2004; Sobel & Cave, 2002).
Bottom-up saliency. The allocation of attention and 
behavioral resources to a particular (salient) stimulus in a 
task depends largely on its relationship to the other stimuli 
contained in the task (Reingold & Stampe, 2004; Rother-
mund & Wentura, 2004; Treisman, 1998; Wolfe, 2001). 
That is, the more an item of a task differs from other stimuli 
in the task, the more salient it becomes, and the more eas-
ily a response based on it can be generated (Cave & Wolfe, 
1990; Wolfe, 2003; Wolfe, Cave, & Franzel, 1989). To illus-
trate, there is a mathematical problem in which children’s 
responses are based entirely on the perceptual, rather than 
the conceptual, features of the task—specifically, the most 
salient task feature.
The task (see Figure 1) involves presenting children 
with two rows containing the same number of counters; 
both rows are equally spaced. Then the distance between 
the counters of one row is increased (the task has also 
been demonstrated with other stimuli—e.g., flowers, 
chocolates, money, and geometric shapes). The status of 
one row has now become salient; that is, there is a percep-
tible difference between the two rows, and this is more 
conspicuous than the fact that the objects in both rows 
are of the same number. Children under the age of 6–7 
years believe that altering the spatial layout of a line of 
objects changes its numerosity; hence, they infer that the 
longer the line, the greater the number of counters, in-
voking the intuitive rule more A–more B. Theorists (e.g., 
Bryant, 1974; Karmiloff-Smith, 1992; Stavy & Tirosh, 
2000) have shown that this is because children are unable 
to distinguish between relevant (e.g., equivalent numeros-
ity) and irrelevant (spatial layout) perceptual cues. Thus, 
the relationship between salient and other task stimuli de-
termines the ease of processing (i.e., the speed at which a 
response is generated), because the salient feature is easily 
discriminable from other task features (Brainerd & Reyna, 
1993; napolitant & Sloutsky, 2004; Rothermund & Wen-
tura, 2004). In summary, bottom-up activation is a mea-
sure of how different an item is from its neighbors. Thus, 
in tasks in which responses are stimulus driven, intuitive 
rules are invoked as a result of perceptual, not conceptual, 
task properties.
top-down saliency. Sobel and Cave (2002) have 
shown that the saliency of a stimulus is determined by 
prior experience of it or by goal-orientated knowledge of 
the task. Thus, exposure to a stimulus that has been repeat-
edly experienced in other learning instances will generate 
a response, regardless of its relationship to other stimuli 
in the task. To illustrate, in Livne’s (1996) task, biology 
majors (Grades 10, 11, and 12) were told that a babysitter 
overheated the milk in a pan. She filled two feeding bottles 
that each contained 100 ml of milk but differed in shape: 
One was spherical, and the other was cylindrical (these 
were represented pictorially in the task). She immersed 
both in ice water. The students were asked whether the 
bottles would cool at the same rate or not and to provide 
explanations. The students focused on the equivalence in 
quantity between the bottles, ignoring the perceptually dis-
cernable differences between the stimuli, and erroneously 
invoked the intuitive same A (same quantity), therefore 
same B (same rate of cooling) rule, rather than consider-
ing the ratio between surface area and volume. Typically, 
they responded that “the time needed to cool the milk in 
both bottles is equal because the amounts of milk in each 
bottle are equal.” In this example, there was perceptual 
information available that had students chosen to base 
their answers on it would have helped to generate a cor-
rect response by cuing relevant taught knowledge. Instead, 
the students matched the equivalence of objects with their 
prior knowledge of ratios to generate responses: These ap-
peared consistent and sensible because they could be justi-
fied through the misapplication of taught knowledge and 
their experiences of ratios. In summary, the application of 
intuitive rules via top-down salient task features depends 
on the degree of match between the conceptual properties 
of an item and similar experiential-based knowledge of 
the set of target properties of that item.
tenetS of the intuitive ruleS 
reSearCh Program
Five main claims have been borne out by the research 
program developed by Stavy and Tirosh (2000). First, at-
tentional and behavioral resources are allocated to particu-
lar properties of a task. This is the result of salient proper-
ties that are stimulus driven (bottom-up saliency) or based 
on prior experience and knowledge (top-down saliency). figure 1. examples of spatial arrays of counters.
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Second, salient properties that are stimulus driven invoke 
intuitive rules implicitly—that is, without the individual’s 
control and without his or her awareness of the application 
of the rule. This is not to say that individuals are unaware 
of the stimuli at encoding; since the stimuli are salient, 
they will have conscious experience of them. Rather, there 
is a lack of awareness of how these stimuli are combined 
to produce a response. In contrast, because top-down sa-
lient features invoke intuitive rules through their match to 
relevant prior experiences and knowledge, the rules are in-
voked automatically, without the individual’s control, but 
are accessible; that is, the reasoner has metaknowledge of 
the rule and of the products of that operation. However, 
the responses generated are based on representations that 
have accumulated strength through repeated exposure 
and are often endorsed by formal knowledge. For these 
reasons, it is difficult to correct responses that are gener-
ated by automatically invoked intuitive rules. Third, auto-
matically invoked intuitive rules are examples of skilled 
reasoning and allow the reasoner to make inferences in a 
range of different contexts without deliberately comput-
ing each sequence of inferences. Fourth, for this reason, 
intuitive rules do not diminish with age and cognitive de-
velopment but actually persist into adulthood. Finally, the 
research program is concerned with investigating reason-
ing phenomena that elicit responses without deliberation. 
This is not to say that children do not engage in reasoning 
that involves deliberate evaluative thinking. The research 
program also includes examples in which children are in-
troduced to new scientific or mathematical principles or 
are prompted to reexamine familiar stimuli in the light of 
alternative hypotheses (e.g., Clement, 1993; Stavy, 1991; 
Stavy & Tirosh, 1993; Tsamir, Tirosh, & Stavy, 1997). 
This form of reasoning is different with respect to intuitive 
rules, because the representations are being manipulated 
deliberately, which is why reasoning from them is executed 
slowly. This redescription of representations is crucial in 
development (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), because it gives 
rise to flexibility in the way information is encoded and 
utilized. Reasoning of this kind is not treated as belonging 
to a system separate from the implicit or automatic forms 
described here, because what appear to change across 
these forms of reasoning are the representations, not the 
inferential process itself (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992).
the Dynamic graded Continuum
We will introduce Cleeremans and Jiménez’s (2002) 
dynamic graded continuum (hereafter, DGC) framework, 
recently discussed by Osman (2004). Osman used this 
framework to unify different forms of reasoning identi-
fied in the adult-reasoning literature. It is introduced here 
because it shares many of the claims made by the intuitive 
rules research program. In particular, the DGC framework 
describes a single reasoning system that includes differ-
ent forms of reasoning (implicit, explicit, and automatic). 
There are different forms of reasoning because of varia-
tions in the quality of representation. Representations in-
crease in quality (i.e., according to their strength, distinc-
tiveness, and stability) along a continuum that leads to 
an equivalent progression in the type of reasoning, from 
implicit to explicit to automatic, for which consciousness 
has different functional roles. As a result of the variation 
in the representations and, consequently, in the different 
functional roles that consciousness plays, the framework 
makes an important distinction between implicit and auto-
matic reasoning. The DGC framework describes implicit 
reasoning as involving weakly represented representations 
that are not stable. The resultant abstractions or infer-
ences are made without a concomitant awareness of them. 
The inferences occur unintentionally and cannot be con-
sciously controlled but, through priming, are still capable 
of influencing explicit processes (Osman, 2004). Explicit 
reasoning involves representations that are stable, strong, 
and distinctive and, so, involve awareness of the abstrac-
tions or inferences that are made. Because the representa-
tions have a high rate of activation and are stable enough 
to become registered in working memory, they can be re-
liably recalled and expressed as declarative knowledge. 
Therefore, metaknowledge of the representations allows 
them to be controlled and manipulated. In contrast, indi-
viduals possess metaknowledge of the representations in 
automatic reasoning but do not have the opportunity to 
control them (J. R. Anderson, 1993). This form of reason-
ing is skill based and is acquired through frequent and 
consistent activation of relevant information that becomes 
highly familiarized. This is why the representations are 
enduring and well defined, and become stable through re-
peated use, but are difficult to modify.
What are the Similarities Between the DgC 
framework and the intuitive rules Program?
Both the OGC framework and the intuitive rules pro-
gram make an important distinction between implicit and 
automatic forms of reasoning, which, although they are 
beyond the control of the individual, differ according to 
whether the reasoner has metaknowledge of the inferences 
made. In addition, the DGC framework describes the prop-
erties of the representations and how they differ between 
these forms of reasoning, whereas the intuitive rules pro-
gram complements this by setting out the task conditions 
that invoke implicit and automatic reasoning. The lack of 
control that is characteristic of the implicit and automatic 
application of intuitive rules results from exposure to par-
ticular task scenarios that include salient features (bottom 
up and top down) that reliably invoke intuitive rules. In the 
DGC framework, there is no conscious control of implicit- 
or automatic-based inferences because, in the former, the 
representations are weak and not stable enough to be reli-
ably recalled in memory, whereas in the latter, the repre-
sentations are so well practiced that they are highly active 
in memory. The function of metaknowledge is to offer the 
child flexibility (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994; Stavy & Tirosh, 
2000). Both the DGC framework and the intuitive rules 
account treat automatic forms of reasoning as skill based 
and, therefore, knowledge based. Thus, the reason intui-
tive rules are pervasive and the application of certain rules 
increases with age into adulthood is that there are contexts 
in which they have provided efficient and accurate re-
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sponses quickly and have, through repeated exposure, be-
come reinforced. Moreover, this representational change 
leads to U-shaped and inverted U-shaped developmental 
curves. For example, performance follows an inverted U-
shaped developmental curve because, initially, children’s 
intuitive rules are invoked through bottom-up salient task 
properties, which lead to a correct response. Once chil-
dren have acquired explicitly taught mathematical or sci-
entific principles, they misapply them to the same task, but 
through practice, they become able to discriminate which 
principles apply to the task and to respond correctly. Like 
the DGC framework, representational change over time is 
critical for the intuitive rules account: This is explained on 
the basis of which properties of a task become salient and 
how the saliency of these properties changes. Changing 
the saliency of task features elicits different responses and 
can improve performance but does not invoke a different 
reasoning system. Rather, it helps to reconceptualize the 
task and to make relevant task features that were previ-
ously treated as irrelevant.
What are the Differences Between  
Dual-System theories of reasoning 
and the intuitive rules Program?
The intuitive rules program differs from a dual-system 
framework in a number of critical ways. Principally, it dif-
ferentiates implicit from automatic forms of reasoning, a 
distinction not made by dual-system theories of reasoning. 
Second, the intuitive rules program outlines differences in 
the source of salient task information. Although saliency 
is an important aspect of the dual-system theories, they 
make no distinction between bottom-up and top-down sa-
liency and between the types of reasoning that follow from 
them. Finally, intuitive rules are claimed to develop with 
cognitive development and age: This is necessary for skill 
development, particularly because cognitive development 
advances so that processes can be executed automatically 
(Cleeremans & Jimenez, 2002; Karmiloff-Smith 1986, 
1992, 1994; Osman, 2004). This issue divides the dual-
system theories. Brainerd and Reyna (2001) claimed that 
reasoning matures in such a way that accurate reasoning 
is carried out by the primary system, whereas Sloman 
(1996) claimed that mastering rules and the contexts in 
which they apply makes it possible to make inferences 
with less effort and is a necessary aspect of development. 
In contrast, Stanovich (1999) and Evans and Over (1996) 
suggested that the development of the inhibitory mecha-
nism of the secondary system is critical for producing ac-
curate and controlled processing styles that inhibit biases 
found in the primary system.
We return to Table 1, which summarizes the critical 
properties of each of the systems described by the dual-
system framework and which will be used in evaluating 
the theories in the following discussion. The evidence pre-
sented in the empirical section of this review is divided 
into three parts: encoding, functioning, and interaction 
between systems. Each subsection will begin with the hy-
potheses that follow from the different dual-system theo-
ries presented in Table 1 and then will describe evidence 
from the intuitive research program, which later will be 
used to evaluate the success of the hypotheses.
emPiriCal SeCtion
encoding
hypotheses. Adult dual-system theories (Evans & 
Over, 1996; Sloman, 1996; Stanovich, 2004) claim that 
representations that become automatically encoded in the 
primary system are stimulus driven or knowledge based 
(including pragmatic knowledge [e.g., deontic rules], 
Gricean implicatures, and feature sets). In contrast, 
Brainerd and Reyna (1990, 2004) have distinguished 
between stimulus- and knowledge-based representations 
and the task situations that generate them, although, as in 
adult dual-system theories, the primary system operates 
over both types of salient representations. Brainerd and 
Reyna predicted that in stimulus-driven tasks, some rep-
resentations pop out and others sink into the background 
and that, in these cases, accurate reasoning is influenced 
by the visual distinctiveness of critical information. In 
conceptually driven salient tasks, which involve sche-
matic situations (i.e., situations that involve mature social 
concepts, such as ethnicity and emotional relationships), 
young children do not extract salient meanings from tar-
get items, because the meanings are not yet understood. 
Reyna and Brainerd (1995) and Sloman (1996) made ex-
plicit that the primary system encodes information about 
concepts that include its internal structure and that the 
information is encoded and stored as patterns and in-
cludes relational information, which can be construed as 
rule-like. This is compatible with the claims made by the 
intuitive rules program and the DGC framework. How-
ever, unlike the dual-system theories, there are implicitly 
and automatically invoked intuitive rules: In the latter, 
children have metaknowledge of the operation. none of 
the dual-system theories predicts that reasoners possess 
knowledge of processes that follows from representa-
tions that are available automatically, even if they are skill 
based (Stanovich, 2004).
evidence. The following is an example of a task in 
which the intuitive rule (more A–more B) is invoked in 
response to stimuli-driven salient task features. Brecher 
(2005; Babai, Brecher, Stavy, & Tirosh, 2006) presented 
high school students majoring in science with a probabil-
ity task. In the task, the students were shown two boxes, 
both of which contained black and gray counters, and 
they were asked to judge from which of the two boxes 
they were more likely to select a black counter. In tasks 
of this kind, it has been shown that the black counters are 
the salient task feature (e.g., Babai & Alon, 2004; Falk, 
Falk, & Levin, 1980; Green, 1983). Brecher included two 
versions of the task. In congruent versions, the frequency 
of the black counters was varied: When the frequency of 
the black counters increased, so did the probability of 
their selection, relative to the number of gray counters. 
In incongruent versions, as the number of black counters 
increased, the probability of selecting a black counter de-
creased (see Figure 2).
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Task difficulty was varied, along with the congruency 
of the task features. In easy tasks, the difference between 
the probability of selecting a blue counter from Box A 
and the probability of selecting it from Box B was percep-
tually distinguishable, whereas in difficult tasks, it was 
not, because the difference between the probability of se-
lecting a blue counter from Box A and the probability of 
selecting it from Box B was small. Given that the salient 
feature is the frequency of black counters, the children’s 
answers were based on the intuitive more A–more B rule. 
That is, of the two boxes, the children focused on the one 
that contained more black counters and inferred that it 
was more probable that a black counter could be picked 
from it. In addition, because the salient task feature was 
perceptually based, saliency was determined by the dis-
criminability between black and gray counters. Therefore, 
in incongruent and difficult versions, in which discrim-
inability was manipulated, the participants’ performance 
and speed of response were adversely affected. If, for ex-
ample, responses to the difficult and easy tasks had been 
based solely on the frequency of black counters, no differ-
ences between difficult and easy tasks would have been 
observed, because the children could use the more A–more 
B rule in both versions. Instead, the findings indicated that 
the children based their answers on the black counters, 
relative to their differentiation from the other task prop-
erties (the frequency of gray to black counters), and that 
because they were more sensitive to both types of stimuli 
in the difficult task, they spent a longer time generating 
their responses, thus providing evidence that the status of 
perceptually salient task stimuli is dependent—on their 
relationship to the surrounding task stimuli. Consistent 
with this, Stavy’s  (Stavy, Goel, Critchley, & Dolan, in 
press; Stavy & Tirosh, 1996, 2000; Stavy, Tirosh, Babai, 
& Levyadun, in press) findings show that reasoning based 
on intuitive rules that are invoked via perceptually salient 
features leads to longer responses times when the discrim-
inability between salient and other task stimuli is reduced. 
Moreover, similar findings have been reported in studies 
in which tasks involve making judgments about perimeters 
(Azhari, 1998; Stavy & Tirosh, 1996, 2000; Stavy, Tirosh, 
Babai, & Levyadun, 2006), and geometric concepts (e.g., 
angles; Stavy & Tirosh, 1996; Tsamir et al. 1997).
The following is an illustration of the application of an 
intuitive rule through top-down saliency. Fischbein and 
Schnarch’s (1997) probability task is based on Tversky 
and Kahneman’s (1972) law-of-large-numbers hospi-
tal problem. The law of large numbers states that as the 
sample size (or the number of trials) increases, the rela-
tive frequencies tend toward the theoretical probabilities 
(.5). In Fischbein and Schnarch’s  version, children as-
sessed whether the probability of getting heads at least 
twice when three coins are tossed is greater than, equal to, 
or less than that of getting at least 200 heads out of 300 
tosses. Here, the salient property of the task is the ratio 
between the number of heads and the number of tosses. 
The results from Fischbein and Schnarch’s (1997) study 
are presented in Table 2. The figures show that most of the 
students in each grade level claimed that the probabilities 
are equal, because the proportions 2/3 and 200/300 are 
equal. Interestingly, the frequency of this erroneous re-
sponse increased with age.
Fischbein and Schnarch (1997) showed that the “equal” 
response increases with age because it tracks the acquisi-
tion and stabilization of the proportion scheme and, with-
out this scheme, children do not infer same A (ratio)–same 
B (probability). Although the evidence suggests that a log-
ical scheme (proportion) is incorrectly applied to solve the 
task, it also demonstrates that there is a relationship be-
tween intuitive reasoning and formal knowledge. Children 
apply the same A–same B rule in a variety of tasks, because 
the concept of equivalence is generalized to a variety of 
contexts. Mendel (1998) presented 11th grade students 
with a problem in which a rectangle was shown. They 
were told that the length of it was decreased by 20% and 
the width was increased by 20%. The changes to the rect-
angle were visually represented. The students were asked 
what difference these changes made to the perimeter. Most 
students (72%) responded erroneously, claiming that the 
perimeter remained the same because “you add 20% and 
removed the same percentage, so they compensate each 
other.” Only 8% of the students understood that the length 
Box A
Task 1 (Type = Congruent)
Easy Version
Task 2 (Type = Incongruent)
Difficult Version
Box B Box A Box B
figure 2. examples of Brecher’s (2005) probability task.
table 2 
reaction times (rts in Seconds) and Proportion of errors 
(Percentage incorrect) in Congruent and 
incongruent Probability tasks
Easy Difficult All tasks
Tasks  RT  % Error  RT  % Error  RT  % Error
Congruent 1,410  7.6 1,769  9.5 1,620  8.7
Incongruent 2,267 18.7  2,616 23.4  2,475 21.5
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of the rectangle is longer than the width, so that a 20% 
reduction in length and a 20% increase in width would 
not keep the perimeter constant. In these and other, similar 
problems, there is perceptual information available that if 
students choose to base their answers on it, will generate 
a correct response by cuing relevant taught knowledge. In-
stead, students make a match between their knowledge of 
the equivalence of objects and of percentages to generate 
responses. These appear consistent and sensible because 
they can be rationalized by taught knowledge.
The findings discussed involve studies of children’s in-
ability to avoid the saliency of task features. The follow-
ing is an illustration of a task in which adults make errors 
similar to those of children, by basing their responses on 
perceptually salient information. In the free-fall task, chil-
dren and adults are shown two matchboxes—one filled 
with sand, the other empty—and are asked to predict what 
will happen when both are dropped from the same height. 
Children and adults argue that the heavier matchbox will 
reach the ground first. Both groups are influenced by the 
difference in weight of the matchboxes and erroneously 
reason that the heavier the box is, the faster it will reach 
the ground (more A–more B). Similar studies conducted 
on first-year college physics students (Champagne, Klop-
fer, & Anderson, 1979; Gunstone & White, 1981) showed 
that although they were aware of newton’s second law 
of motion, which states that the speed of a falling body 
depends on the height from which it falls and is indepen-
dent of the mass of the body, most based their answers on 
the perceptually salient property, claiming that the heavier 
box would reach the ground sooner.
Discussion. All the dual-system theories distinguish be-
tween the information encoded by the primary system and 
that encoded by the secondary system. In fact, they make 
distinctions based on the content of the representations. The 
evidence from the studies shows that the kinds of rule-based 
inferences that are invoked from formal-based knowledge 
and from perceptually salient task features are the same. In 
addition, in contrast to dual-system theories of reasoning, 
this distinction is independent of the content of the stimuli. 
The evidence shows that the particular properties of a task 
that are salient will change throughout the course of devel-
opment (e.g., Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997). Because of this, 
salient features in themselves are unlikely to be associated 
with particular forms of reasoning, because they can invoke 
both intuitive schemes and formal scientific, mathematical, 
and logical schemes. For example, tasks in which bottom-up 
salience invokes intuitive rules (typically, the more A–more 
B rule) include physical, chemical, or biological attributes, 
such as weight (Stavy & Stachel, 1985), temperature (Stavy 
& Berkovitz, 1980), concentration (Strauss, Stavy, Orpaz, 
& Carmi, 1982), cellular size (Stavy & Tirosh, 2000), and 
speed (Stavy & Tirosh, 2000). For bottom-up saliency, the 
discriminability of salient stimuli from other task features 
is critical to invoking the application of intuitive rules, and 
these rules are not dependent on the content of the salient 
task features.
Sloman’s (1996) Criterion S, which other dual-system 
theorists endorse (i.e., Evans & Over, 1996; Stanovich & 
West, 2000), describes conditions under which both pri-
mary and secondary systems cue contradictory responses 
in the same task. Reducing the discriminability between 
salient and other features present in the task generates con-
flicts. Under these conditions, children are slower to invoke 
intuitive rules to generate a response, and the processing 
is not automatic, because the children are evaluating more 
than just the salient task feature. Is this support for Crite-
rion S? It appears that there is a conflict, but there is little 
to suggest that the conflict reflects competing reasoning 
systems. Instead, the evidence suggests that the conflicts 
that are identified in incongruent tasks do not arise from 
distinct reasoning systems but can, instead, consistent 
with the DGC framework, be interpreted as a result of the 
varying strengths of the representations utilized while rea-
soning (Osman, 2004). The discriminability between sa-
lient and other task stimuli can be manipulated gradually, 
and it is not shifts in reasoning that occur; children simply 
encode the stimuli differently and are forced to pay closer 
attention to other stimuli that were previously neglected. 
The attentional status of salient task properties changes 
because other task stimuli are similar to the salient stimu-
lus (i.e., the discriminability is reduced); therefore, recov-
ery from capture is possible only after an extended time, 
in order to allow for disengagement and redirection from 
the other task stimuli and back to the salient task proper-
ties (Azhari, 1998; Babai, Levyadun, Stavy, & Tirosh, in 
press; Stavy & Tirosh, 1996, 2000).
We will turn now to the second source of saliency: top 
down. Consistent with evidence from studies of saliency 
in perception (e.g., Greenberg, 1966; Kim & Cave, 1999; 
Pratto & John, 1991; Wentura, 2000; Wentura, Rother-
mund, & Bak, 2000), the evidence presented in this sec-
tion will suggest that children match some property of the 
task with their knowledge. Examples of this kind of rea-
soning demonstrate how advanced knowledge, intentions, 
and goals automatically guide attention through a task, 
until a match is made between the properties of the task 
and knowledge and prior experience. The findings show 
that these salient properties can have a formal abstract 
basis (e.g., proportion or equivalence) and that a particu-
lar scientific or mathematical concept is matched to a va-
riety of stimuli from a range of tasks and is not restricted 
to one domain. These are characteristics of representa-
tions that are consistent with the dual-system theories of 
reasoning hypothesis of primary (e.g., global, structural, 
or relational) representations and secondary systems 
(e.g., formal or abstract). Another problematic aspect of 
intuitive rules invoked from top-down salient stimuli is 
that children show awareness of using them (e.g., Livne, 
1996; Mendel, 1998; Stavy & Tirosh, 2000) and can pro-
vide formal justifications for their responses because of 
the logical basis of their answers (e.g., Tirosh & Stavy, 
1996). Finally, the acquisition of formally taught logical, 
scientific, and mathematical principles can increase the 
application of particular intuitive rules (e.g., Fischbein & 
Schnarch, 1997), because children are able to generalize 
their knowledge and match this to problem information 
in a variety of domains, which sustains the application of 
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intuitive rules into adulthood. Only Brainerd and Reyna 
(2001) have claimed that children learn to rely on gist rep-
resentations that are operated over by the primary system 
for accurate and efficient reasoning and that this persists 
into adulthood.
functioning
hypotheses. Sloman (1996) and Reyna and Brainerd 
(1995) have posited that there is a level of flexibility in the 
functioning of the primary system, whereas Stanovich and 
West (2000) and Evans and Over (1996) have described 
the system as invariant and have claimed that only the sec-
ondary system is flexible, because it is conscious and de-
pendent on executive functions. Consequently, dual-system 
theorists are divided according to whether the systems can 
be indexed by measures of executive functions (e.g., work-
ing memory span, digit span, reading comprehension, and 
Scholastic Aptitude Test scores). Evans and Over (1996) 
and Stanovich and West (2000) hypothesized that perfor-
mance that is based on the secondary system is predicted by 
cognitive ability measures, because measures of cognitive 
capacity directly reflect the likelihood of the secondary sys-
tems overriding the response primed by the primary system, 
in cases in which the two systems conflict. Therefore, they 
predicted that individuals that achieve high scores on tests 
of executive functions will perform better on a variety of 
reasoning tasks that lead both systems to generate contra-
dictory responses. Individuals with poorer cognitive ability 
will perform poorly on these tasks, because the secondary 
system is unable to inhibit erroneous responses generated 
by the primary system.
Stanovich and West (2000) and Evans and Over (1996) 
also proposed that because the primary system is robust, it 
is spared by aging (Gilinksy & Judd, 1994) and neurologi-
cal damage (e.g., Deglin & Kinsbourne, 1996). Because 
of this, they predicted that inverted U-shaped develop-
ment occurs, in which the development of executive func-
tions tracks improvements in performance in reasoning 
tasks but declines as executive functions become impaired 
through aging. Only Brainerd and Reyna have explicitly 
described the basis on which U-shaped and inverted U-
shaped development occurs. Finally, all dual-system 
theorists agree that the secondary system involves meta-
representations and is under the conscious control of the 
individual. This is why it operates much more slowly than 
the primary system.
evidence. The following studies have used comparison 
tasks that were based on formally taught schemes, such 
as volume, weight, and area. The examples that will be 
discussed illustrate a range of different patterns in perfor-
mance, in which it increases with age, decreases with age, 
and shows a U-shaped developmental curve. All of these 
are dependent on the application of the intuitive more 
A–more B and same A–same B rules. In the cylinders task 
(Stavy & Tirosh, 2000; Tirosh & Stavy, 1999), students are 
presented with two identical rectangular sheets of paper, 
one of which is rotated by 90º (see Figure 3).
They are then asked to judge whether the area of Sheet 1 
is equal to, larger than, or smaller than the area of Sheet 2 
(Piaget et al., 1960). Many studies (e.g., Piaget et al., 1960; 
Tirosh & Stavy, 1999) have shown that for young children, 
the salient feature is the difference in either the length or 
the width of the two sheets (bottom-up saliency), whereas 
for older children and adults, the salient feature is the iden-
tical area of both sheets of paper (top-down saliency; Stavy 
& Tirosh, 2000; Tirosh & Stavy, 1999). After the presen-
tation of the rectangular sheets, each sheet is then rolled 
to form a cylinder (see Figure 3), and the students are 
asked to judge whether the volume of Cylinder 1 is equal 
to, larger than, or smaller than the volume of Cylinder 2. 
For young children, the salient property is the difference 
in either the height or the width of the two cylinders (bot-
tom-up saliency), whereas older children and adults focus 
on the equivalent area of the original sheets that form the 
cylinders (top-down saliency).
The area question has been used to examine whether 
students have a concept of conservation based on area. 
The volume question has been used to examine whether 
students can correctly avoid generalizing the concept of 
conservation to volume. Responses to the questions (see 
Figure 4) in Stavy and Tirosh’s (2000) study have been 
consistent with Piaget et al.’s (1960) original findings. 
They have shown that the conservation scheme does not 
emerge until Grade 2. Children without the conservation 
scheme tend to erroneously invoke the intuitive more A 
(length)–more B (area) rule, based on perceptually salient 
task features. However, they also rely on perceptually 
salient features to respond to the volume question and 
infer more A (width)–more B (volume), which generates 
the correct response. After the second grade, children 
now correctly answer the first question, using the logical 
conservation scheme, and use identity, reversibility, ad-
dition, and compensation to support their decision. How-
ever, there is a sharp increase in erroneous responses to 
the volume question, in which they invoke the intuitive 
same (paper area)–same (cylinder volume) rule. To sup-
port their answers, many students give such explanations 
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figure 3. example of the cylinders conservation task.
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as “the volumes of the two cylinders are the same because 
they are made from identical sheets of paper.” Educated 
adults presented with this task also give the same incorrect 
answers to the volume question. Tirosh and Stavy (1999) 
claimed that the development and stabilization of the con-
servation scheme replaces the intuitive more A–more B 
rule because conceptual knowledge, rather than stimu-
lus-driven saliency, guides responses. Consequently, the 
salient feature of the task now becomes the “equivalence” 
between the areas of both shapes. The findings demon-
strate that the application of intuitive rules changes as a 
result of an overlearned logical scheme that, in this case, 
is applied inappropriately.
A similar version of the cylinders problem is the con-
tainers problem, in which children reason about weight 
and volume (Bruner, 1966; Piaget & Inhelder, 1974; Stavy 
& Tirosh, 2000; Tirosh & Stavy, 1999). Students are typi-
cally presented with two containers with equal amounts 
of water. One of the containers is later heated, and the 
students observe the water level rising. They are asked 
to judge whether the weight and the volume of the water 
in the containers differ before and after heating. This is 
another example in which the saliency of task properties 
changes with age and, in this case, with the acquisition 
of particular taught schemes (Stavy & Tirosh, 2000). The 
task was originally designed to examine whether children 
show knowledge that, after heating, weight is conserved 
(W1 5 W2) but volume is not (V2 . V1). As Figure 5 shows, 
performance in response to the weight question increases 
with age and tracks the acquisition and stabilization of 
the conservation scheme leading children to infer same A 
(weight before heating)–same B (weight after heating). In 
the case of the volume question, after Grade 6, the major-
ity of students respond correctly. At this stage, students 
are formally taught the particulate nature of matter (i.e., 
understanding how particles react under different states), 
which is endorsed by the perceptual information from the 
task, (i.e., the volume is larger in the heated container, and 
visibly so), which facilitates correct responding. Students 
in Grades 2 and 3 are also able to answer the volume ques-
tion correctly but rely on the perceptually salient features 
of the task and have no metaknowledge of the basis for 
their inferences.
In contrast, in Grades 4–6, the conservation scheme for 
weight stabilizes, and so students respond by applying the 
intuitive same A (weight)–same B (volume) rule and often 
justify their answer by claiming that “it’s the same water; 
therefore, it’s the same volume.” The striking aspect of this 
result is that they ignore the most visually salient informa-
tion in favor of the abstract concept equivalence, in order 
to invoke the intuitive rule.
Formal knowledge can help strengthen the application 
of an intuitive rule in a correct context, but also inappropri-
ately and independently of perceptually salient features. In 
addition, the application of intuitive rules is independent 
of measures of cognitive capacity. To illustrate, Babai and 
Alon (2004) examined the relationship between cogni-
tive ability and the application of intuitive rules. A variety 
of tasks that invoked intuitive rules were correlated with 
cognitive ability, measured by validated Piagetian-based 
tests (Adey, Shayer, & yates, 2001). These included tests 
of number, area and conservation, spatial perception, se-
riation, reversibility, and proportionality. Babai and Alon 
(2004) reported that the intuitive more A–more B rule 
decreased as cognitive ability increased (especially in 
tasks that relied on logical schemes, such as conservation 
or proportion). However, Babai and Alon also reported 
that the intuitive same A–same B and everything can be 
divided rules increased as cognitive ability increased. 
younger students’ answers to a variety of problems were 
based on concrete perceptual features (e.g., conservation-
volume tasks), whereas older students learned to ignore 
these in favor of taught logical schemes. Many of the find-
ings from studies of cognitive ability have shown that the 
application of logical schemes can often hinder students’ 
performance, because they are overgeneralized to inap-
propriate task domains (e.g., Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997; 
Tirosh & Stavy, 1996).
Discussion. The evidence presented here suggests that 
the application of intuitive rules changes and that the rea-
soning process is flexible. Children use formal rules to 
help assert their intuitive rules, as has been shown with 
the containers and cylinders tasks, because they learn to 
reinforce their experiences of intuitive rules with relevant, 
formally taught knowledge (e.g., Dixon & Moore, 1996; 
Siegler, 1999; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989; Stavy & Tirosh, 
2000). That is, children’s intuitive rules adapt over the 
course of development: Some are enhanced and persist 
into adulthood, and new intuitive rules are generated to 
accompany newly acquired, formally taught knowledge 
(Dixon & Moore, 1996; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989; Stavy 
& Tirosh, 2000; Tirosh & Stavy, 1999). Studies of intui-
tive reasoning also have shown that the development and 
function of intuitive rules is closely related to the acquisi-
tion of formal knowledge. Conversely, the availability of 
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figure 4. Distribution of equality judgment (percentages of 
correct responses), by age, to the task involving the surface area 
and volume of the two cylinders.
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formally taught knowledge and its application to new and 
familiar task domains are related to the intuitive princi-
ples that the individual has acquired. Stanovich and West 
(2000) and Evans and Over (1996) have claimed that the 
primary system is inflexible. However, consistent with this 
evidence, Sloman (1996) and Reyna and Brainerd (1995) 
have claimed that the primary system is flexible because 
of the kinds of representations that it operates over.
In the cylinders problem, performance on the volume 
question decreases with age (Stavy & Tirosh, 2000), 
whereas in the containers problem, performance on the 
volume question follows a U-shaped curve (Stavy & 
Tirosh, 2000; Tirosh & Stavy, 1999). The latter pattern of 
performance has also been supported by other studies, in 
which reasoning that involves intuitive rules in very young 
and older students converges (e.g., Bedard et al., 2002; 
Kail & Salthouse, 1994; Sloutsky & Fisher, 2004; Stavy, 
1981; Stavy & Berkovitz, 1980; Strauss & Stavy, 1982; 
Strauss et al., 1982). Moreover, U-shaped patterns of de-
velopment have been found for a variety of processes: face 
perception (Cashon & Cohen, 2004), memory consolida-
tion (e.g., Brainerd, Reyna, & Kneer, 1995; Seamon et al., 
2002), and retrieval (e.g., Dosher, 1984; Dosher & Rose-
dale, 1991). Thus, many cognitive processes are nonmono-
tonic, and this is why studies are unable to reliably index 
performance on reasoning tasks through measures of cog-
nitive ability (e.g., Babai & Alon, 2004). Unlike dual-sys-
tem theories of adult reasoning (i.e., Evans & Over, 1996; 
Stanovich & West, 2000), fuzzy-trace theory (Brainerd, 
2004) does not relate accurate reasoning to examples of 
accurate executive functioning (e.g., memory accuracy). 
Consistent with the evidence from intuitive rules, Brainerd 
and Reyna have shown that certain biases (e.g., framing 
effects; i.e., even when formally identical, instructional 
changes can have marked effects on responses) increase 
with age (Reyna, 1996; Reyna & Ellis, 1994) and with 
cognitive development (e.g., Davidson, 1995).
The principal characteristic of the primary system 
that is shared by all of the dual-system theories is that 
it is executed automatically and that there is no accom-
panying metaknowledge of the inferential steps that are 
carried out. Studies in which the cylinder and contain-
ers tasks have been used have shown that children reason 
through the application and coordination of logical infer-
ences and that these can be guided by justifiable formal 
norms (Moshman, 2004). This particularly raises prob-
lems for dual-system theories that consign all examples 
of automatic reasoning to the primary system. The DGC 
framework and the account offered by the intuitive rules 
program predict differences between skill-based learning 
(e.g., overgeneralized, formally taught knowledge) and 
implicit-based reasoning. This position is able to accom-
modate the evidence from studies showing U-shaped de-
velopmental curves and the properties of the reasoning 
that emerges across the curve. For instance, although, in 
the containers task, the responses of children in Grades 2 
and 11 are the same and the intuitive rules that are invoked 
are the same, the source of the information encoded is 
different. In the older age group, the inferences are based 
on differences at the particle level, which relies on explic-
itly taught rules that are rehearsed and later applied auto-
matically. The relationship between automatic reasoning 
processing and analytical processing is inconsistent with 
many of the dual-system theories, because they attribute 
formal abstract knowledge to the secondary system. Al-
though there are examples in which intuitive rules are in-
voked quickly, without awareness of the rule, inconsistent 
with dual-system theorists’ claims, there are examples in 
which intuitive rules are rationalized, correctly, through 
formal-based knowledge.
interaction Between the Systems
hypotheses. It is difficult to evaluate the dual-system 
theories’ hypotheses concerning the interaction between 
the systems, because these theories posit a close relation-
ship between the primary and the secondary systems and 
posit that, because the systems complement each other in 
most tasks, the systems cannot be independently identi-
fied in a given task (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Sloman, 
1996; Stanovich & West, 2000). However, because all 
the theories predict conflicts between the systems and 
because the systems are said to cue different responses 
under conditions that fulfill Criterion S, the evidence from 
the intuitive rules program will be evaluated in the light of 
these hypotheses.
evidence. The evidence presented here focuses on 
examples in which conflicts are generated between dif-
ferent sources of knowledge that children rely on and on 
how they are resolved. Tutoring studies (e.g., Clement, 
1993; Stavy, 1981, 1991; Tsamir et al., 1997) have shown 
that children gain insight into their erroneous reasoning in 
tasks in which conflicts are generated between their own 
knowledge and task information. To illustrate, Tirosh and 
Tsamir (1996) presented students (Grades 10–12) with a 
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figure 5. Distribution of equality judgment (percentages of 
correct responses), by age, to the task involving the weight and 
volume of water.
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problem with two infinite sets, Set 1{1, 2, 3, 4, …} and 
Set 2{1, 4, 9, 16, …}, and asked whether the number of 
elements in the sets was the same. To answer the problem 
correctly, children should focus on the one-to-one corre-
spondence between the elements in Set 1 and Set 2. How-
ever, instead, they focus on the differences between the 
sequences of numbers in the sets, basing their responses 
on the fact that there are missing elements in the sequence 
of the elements in Set 2. Students make the more A–more 
B inference, claiming that Set 1 contains more elements 
because Set 1 includes the numbers in Set 2 and those 
missing from Set 2. The students were then presented with 
an equivalent problem, but with Sets A{1, 2, 3, 4, …} 
and B{12, 22, 32, 42, …}. In this version, the equivalence 
between the sets was inferred because n is matched to 
n2. When the students were asked to reexamine their re-
sponses to Sets 1 and 2, a conflict was generated between 
their initial tendency to treat the sets as different and their 
awareness of the one-to-one correspondence between the 
elements, which was emphasized by their responses to 
Set A and Set B. However, they were able to correct their 
answers, because they understood the source of conflict 
between the two equivalent tasks.
In Siegler’s (1976) study, children were presented with 
a series of tasks that measured their knowledge of the ar-
ithmetical rules that governed a balance beam. Included 
in these were conflict-based problems: conflict-weight, in 
which the side with more weight always tipped down; con-
flict-distance, in which the side with the weight furthest 
from the fulcrum would tip down; and conflict-balance, in 
which the two factors, weight and distance, would cancel 
out and the beam would balance. Depending on which 
properties of the task the children focused on, Siegler 
(1976) was able to predict performance on the various 
problems. He argued that the children focusing only on 
weight to make predictions about whether the beam would 
balance or tip reasoned “more weight, then more likely to 
fall” (Rule 1). The children focusing on weight and dis-
tance used Rule 1 as a default, and then, if this was not 
fulfilled, they inferred “more distant from the fulcrum, 
then more likely to fall” (Rule 2). The children follow-
ing Rule 3 used a combination of both, “more weight 1 
distance from the fulcrum, then more likely to fall,” by 
trying to incorporate their knowledge of proportionality, 
which is also necessary in creating balance in the beam. 
However, they did include the composition rule of sum-
ming the products of weight and distance on each side of 
the fulcrum (Rule 4), which was evident in children 16–17 
years of age.
Siegler (1976) found that there was good performance 
on the conflict-weight tasks by the children following 
Rules 1, 2, and 4, whereas only the children following 
Rule 4 correctly solved the conflict-distance and conflict-
balance tasks. In the conflict-distance tasks, the children’s 
performance was poor for different reasons: Rule 1 fol-
lowers used only weight as a property on which to base 
their answers, whereas followers of Rules 2 and 3 took 
distance into account but their understanding of these 
concepts was incorrect. Conflict-balance tasks created the 
most difficulty among the children, particularly followers 
of Rules 2 and 3. The reason for this was that the problems 
generated an equilibrium outcome but the rules the chil-
dren used focused their attention on both cues (weight and 
distance), either of which suggested that the beam would 
tip (e.g., three weights on second peg vs. six on first peg), 
and so, because the children did not have the correct rule 
to integrate this knowledge, they inferred that the beam 
would tip, because of either the weight or the distance. 
Siegler (1976) showed that a task can generate conflicts 
that arise from competing rules that the reasoner finds 
difficult to reconcile.
Similarly, Stavy (2006) showed that competing intuitive 
rules could arise in reasoning tasks performed by adults. In 
a version of the probability task similar to that in Brecher 
(2005), Stavy (2006) presented adults with two boxes with 
pink and white drops of paint. On the basis of the ratio of 
white to pink, the reasoners had to decide whether, after 
combining the different colored paints in each box, the 
color would be equivalent in both or whether the paint in 
one of the boxes would be darker. In congruent versions, 
the quantity of red drops was larger in the box that would 
yield the darker paint (i.e., there was a larger ratio of red 
to white), therefore invoking the intuitive more A–more 
B rule. In incongruent versions of the two boxes, the one 
containing the more red drops either yielded equal dark-
ness or was lighter in color than the other box (i.e., there 
was a larger ratio of white to red). Because the participants 
focused on the frequency of red drops in each box, re-
sponses to congruent versions were quicker and more ac-
curate than those to incongruent versions, consistent with 
previous studies (e.g., Brecher, 2005; Falk et al., 1980; 
Stavy & Tirosh, 1996). However, Stavy (2006) included 
a series of congruent versions with ratios that included, 
for example, Box A (Red 2: White 3) and Box B (Red 
3: White 4). Although the box with the larger number of 
red drops also yielded the darkest color, the difference 
between this and the other congruent versions was that the 
number of white drops also increased with the number of 
red drops. This radically reduced performance to chance. 
Stavy (2006) was able to show that the adults spent lon-
ger solving these congruent versions because two intui-
tive rules were cued in the same task; that is, conflicts 
arose between the intuitive more A (red drops)–more B 
(darker) and more A (white drops)–more B (lighter color) 
rules. Thus, Stavy (2006) demonstrated that adults were 
susceptible to the same kinds of salient task properties as 
children, which, in this case, generated conflicts between 
the outcomes of the different intuitive rules.
Discussion. In this review, the discussion of the evi-
dence for different forms of encoding suggests that con-
flicts can arise between competing representations. The 
evidence presented here also shows that conflicts can 
occur between competing rules. The rules appear to be 
mutually exclusive because there is no other relevant 
knowledge that can reconcile or integrate the possibilities 
(e.g., Siegler, 1976; Tirosh & Tsamir, 1996). This is also 
why children spend a longer time generating responses 
(e.g., Stavy, 2006) and performance is at chance (Siegler, 
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1976; Stavy, 2006). Dual-system theorists claim that rea-
soners lack the necessary information to resolve conflicts, 
which is why they take longer to solve tasks that generate 
them. However, the evidence suggests that it is not the case 
that children are required to inhibit erroneous responses 
generated by the primary system. Rather, they do not have 
the requisite knowledge, or they fail to apply such knowl-
edge in order to integrate the conflicting information (e.g., 
Tirosh & Tsamir, 1996) or rules (e.g., Diamond, Kirkham, 
& Amso, 2002; Siegler, 1976; Stavy, 2006).
Evidence of conflicts between representations and rules 
does not fit precisely with the kind of conflicts described 
by dual-system theories of reasoning. With the exception 
of Reyna and Brainerd (1995), who predicted conflicts 
between representations (i.e., gist vs. verbatim) because 
they are based in separate memory stores, dual-system 
theories of reasoning predict conflicts only between rea-
soning systems. However, competition between two seem-
ingly relevant rules, or representations, cannot be ruled 
out under a dual-system framework. For example, a task 
(e.g., the balance beam) in which there are conflicts be-
tween rules could be the result of the reasoner’s retrieving 
two relevant, associated rules from long-term memory. 
Similarly, Evans and Over’s (1996, 2004) relevance prin-
ciple does not exclude the possibility that more than one 
representation or model is relevant in the current context. 
What the evidence presented here does suggest is that 
conflicts per se cannot reliably be taken as evidence of 
competing reasoning systems, and this is true not only of 
developmental research. There have been many examples 
of people reasoning about mutually exclusive possibili-
ties (e.g., newcomb’s paradox, and the liar’s paradox) that 
have demonstrated competition between abstract concepts. 
Under the dual-system framework, these would have to be 
construed as competition within the secondary system, 
which is inconsistent with the claims of any dual-system 
theory of reasoning.
Another property of Criterion S tasks is that they in-
duce sudden insight that can momentarily lead to correct 
responding, but the dominance of the primary system 
makes reasoners unable to inhibit it, and so they return 
to their default erroneous response. Consistent with this, 
there are examples from studies of intuitive rule use in 
which the insights gained during tutoring tasks are sudden 
(e.g., Dembo, Levin, & Siegler, 1997; Zietsman & Clem-
ent, 1997). However, there are also examples in which 
insight occurred gradually (e.g., Siegler & Stern, 1998; 
Stavy, 1981; Tsamir et al., 1997). What is common to 
tasks that generate both sudden and gradual insights is that 
they generate insight by manipulating the saliency of task 
features. Repeated exposure to the correct task property 
cues children to examine and evaluate the task based on 
it (e.g., Dixon & Moore, 1996; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989) 
or degrades the saliency of irrelevant task features (e.g., 
Clement, 1993; Stavy, 1991; Tsamir, Tirosh et al., 1997). 
In younger children (Grades 2 and 3), insight occurs be-
cause children become overly familiar with the task envi-
ronment from which the original intuitive rule developed 
and this forces a change (Dixon & Moore, 1996; Siegler & 
Jenkins, 1989). Older children learn to seek out new strat-
egies because their repertoire of strategies has broadened 
and, so, they can combine them in novel ways (Crowley & 
Siegler, 1999; Siegler, 1999; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989).
Sudden insight is taken as indicative of shifts in reason-
ing systems, whereas the evidence suggests that although 
this occurs, it is the result of children’s reconceptualizing 
the task (Karmiloff-Smith, 1994), either through tech-
niques that are taught to them when they encounter an 
impasse or through actively trying to motivate a change in 
their understanding of a given task. This process does not 
need to be considered to be the result of changes in reason-
ing systems, and the evidence suggests that often, children 
are simply evaluating task properties that were not salient 
when they initially embarked on solving the task.
Summary
The objectives of this review were twofold. First, the aim 
was to contrast the claims made by dual-system theories 
of adult reasoning with a developmental account that also 
incorporates the same framework. Second, the approach 
undertaken in this review has been hypothesis driven, and 
through this, the aim was to evaluate dual-system theories 
of reasoning in the light of evidence from a developmental 
research program. The motivation for this approach was 
based on the simple assumption that a successful theory 
of reasoning needs to account for reasoning behavior in 
children, as well as in adults. Thus, a rigorous evaluation 
of the claims made by dual-system theories of reasoning 
could be achieved by standing them up against a relevant 
body of research that has not previously been aligned with 
either a single- or a dual-system framework of reasoning.
evidence in agreement With Dual-System 
theories of reasoning
Children invoke intuitive rules as early as Grade 2, and 
typically, children generate solutions rapidly and without 
intention. Consequently, the ubiquity of intuitive rules can 
be costly, because they are often misapplied and this pro-
duces erroneous responses. Intuitive rules are also robust, 
and children have difficulty overcoming the application of 
intuitive rules, which is why some such rules strengthen, 
rather than diminish, with age. These characteristics pro-
vide strong evidence that intuitive rules share many char-
acteristics with the primary reasoning system proposed by 
dual-system theories of reasoning.
evidence Consistent With Some Claims made by 
Dual-System theories of reasoning
Stavy and Tirosh (2000) have shown that children use 
formal rules to help assert their intuitive thinking, because 
they reinforce their experience with relevant, formally 
taught knowledge (e.g., Dixon & Moore, 1996; Siegler, 
1999; Siegler & Jenkins, 1989; Stavy & Tirosh, 2000). 
Conversely, intuitive processing increases the generation 
of formal representations (Ahl, Moore, & Dixon, 1992; 
Carraher, Carraher, & Schliemann, 1985; Ceci & Liker, 
1986; Stavy & Tirosh, 2000). This evidence points to the 
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flexibility of the process that relies on intuitive rules. If 
one assumes that intuitive rules are invoked by processes 
that dual-system theories treat as primary, this evidence 
is consistent with Sloman (1996), who proposed that the 
primary system is able to reason from newly experienced 
stimuli through a similarity-based method of generaliza-
tion. In addition, Reyna and Brainerd (1995) also claimed 
that the primary system is flexible, but for the reason that 
it accommodates developmental changes in the extraction 
and abstraction of different gist representations.
evidence inconsistent With Some Claims made 
by Dual-System theories of reasoning
Dual-system theories of adult reasoning claim that in-
dividual differences in measures of cognitive ability can 
be used to identify different reasoning systems. Some de-
velopmental studies have shown that with cognitive de-
velopment comes the ability to override the application 
of heuristics through executive functions (e.g., Handley, 
Capon, Beveridge, Dennis, & Evans, 2004; Klaczynski 
& Robinson, 2000; Kokis, MacPherson, Toplak, West, & 
Stanovich, 2002). However, there is also evidence that as 
cognitive ability increases, so does the use of the intui-
tive same A–same B and everything can be divided rules. 
In addition, college students and adults fail the Piagetian 
concrete operational conservation task, by applying the 
intuitive more A–more B rule (e.g., Winer, Craig, & Wien-
baum, 1992; Winer & McGlone, 1993). These findings 
raise problems for dual-system theories of adult reasoning 
for two reasons. First, given that measures of cognitive 
ability track decreases and increases in the application of 
intuitive rules, it follows that intuitive and formal analytic 
reasoning must share some functional properties that are 
indexed by these measures. Second, U-shaped develop-
mental curves are not predicted by some dual-system the-
ories of reasoning (Evans & Over, 1996, 2004; Stanovich 
& West, 2000). These indicate nonmonotonic increases in 
performance in a variety of cognitive and motor skills that 
are inconsistent with explanations of monotonic increases 
in the development of basic capacities—for example, 
working memory, metacognition, content knowledge, and 
analytical skills.
evidence inconsistent With Claims made by 
Dual-System theories of reasoning
The evidence presented in this review suggests that 
implicit and automatic forms of reasoning are part of 
the same system but are invoked according to different 
types of salient properties. The difficulty in evaluating 
the hypotheses of dual-system theories of reasoning with 
the evidence presented in the review is that the intuitive 
rules program shows that although implicit and automatic 
forms of reasoning differ according to the accessibil-
ity of the representations that are utilized, the reasoning 
operation that follows from both is the same. Therefore, 
the alignment of the reasoning phenomena to one or the 
other system is problematic, because intuitive rules share 
properties of both the primary and the secondary systems. 
From this, the hypothesis that follows is that if dual-sys-
tem theories of reasoning treat phenomena that have been 
described in this review as support for the primary system, 
the diversity of these phenomena call into question the 
unitary nature of the primary system.
In order to posit two systems of reasoning, the systems’ 
functions must be computationally incompatible with 
each other, so that the same function cannot be carried out 
by both systems (Sherry & Schacter, 1987). If we take the 
evidence of skill-based reasoning (e.g., the acquisition of 
the concept of proportionality), the intuitive rules program 
shows that it is first acquired explicitly and, through prac-
tice, is applied and generalized automatically to a variety 
of task domains (e.g., Fischbein & Schnarch, 1997; Tirosh 
& Stavy, 1996). From this, the hypothesis that follows is 
that from a dual-system framework of reasoning, the evi-
dence of skill-based reasoning, which demonstrates that 
formal knowledge can be acquired and used explicitly, 
can be taken to exemplify processing consistent with the 
secondary reasoning system. However, the same evidence 
also shows that processing is automatic, which from a 
dual-system framework is consistent with what is referred 
to as the primary reasoning system. If skill-based reason-
ing can be both formal and automatic, it shows that either 
the same function can be carried out by both systems or 
an expansion of the dual-system framework is needed in 
which there are four components (i.e., conscious–ana-
lytic, conscious–heuristic, unconscious–analytic, and 
unconscious–heuristic; Klaczynski, 2001). In the case of 
the latter, if we accept the need for parsimony, the four 
components that have been identified can be treated as 
different examples of the same underlying reasoning sys-
tem. Therefore, the problems concerning where the in-
teractive relationship between seemingly similar reason-
ing processes exists is avoided, because the evidence for 
intuitive rules is consistent with a single-system account 
of reasoning.
The very issues that cannot be reconciled within a dual-
system framework are, however, entirely consistent with 
the DGC single framework of reasoning. The DGC frame-
work has been developed to explain implicit and automatic 
learning and has been applied to explain reasoning phe-
nomena (Osman, 2004), and it predicts the very differ-
ences reported in the intuitive rules program. The DGC 
framework proposes that automatic reasoning involves 
representations that are accessible because they are highly 
stable and distinctive and, thus, that the memory traces are 
difficult to overcome. Implicit reasoning involves weakly 
represented representations that have not accumulated 
strength through repeated exposure to the same types of 
learning environments as have automatic representations, 
which is why children are unaware of the intuitive rules 
that are implemented. Moreover, this is why conceptual-
based errors resulting from intuitive rules invoked by 
top-down salient features are more difficult to overcome 
than perceptual-based errors resulting from intuitive rules 
invoked by bottom-up salient features. The framework 
proposes that all contexts are essentially learning environ-
ments in which extrapolation and generalization occur. In 
addition, children, like adults, develop useful rules that are 
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supported by formal knowledge that demonstrates exper-
tise in a given problem domain. On this basis, the review 
concludes that the challenge remains for dual-system theo-
ries of reasoning to develop an account that accommodates 
the range of findings discussed in this review alongside 
evidence from studies of adult reasoning.
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